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NOTES
EXECUTIVE POWER TO PROVIDE MATERIAL AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND NGOS LINKED
TO TERRORIST GROUPS
ALEXA E. CRAIG*
INTRODUCTION
Since the Iran-Contra affair1 in the 1980s, the President’s power in
foreign affairs, while questioned, has been constrained very little.2  Con-
stitutional questions about executive power in the international arena
have largely transformed into statutory ones.  While statutes are more
adaptable to changing circumstances than the Constitution, the statu-
tory questions continue to address the issues generated by the Fram-
ers.3  Uncertainty regarding the scope of executive power has another
cause: courts often dismiss cases about the constitutionality of the Presi-
dent’s actions for standing reasons.  For instance, one of the latest cases
that could have precipitated a serious discussion of the President’s for-
eign affairs powers is Bernstein v. Kerry.4  If the court had not dismissed
* Notre Dame Law School, J.D. Candidate, May 2015. I would like to thank Profes-
sor Anthony J. Bellia for his support and guidance.  I would also like to thank my family
and friends for challenging me both personally and professionally.
1. The Reagan administration covertly facilitated the sale of arms to Iran in order
to secure the release of hostages there and to fund the Nicaraguan Contras contrary to
the Boland Amendment, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1904, 1935 (1984).  The
plan was that Israel would ship weapons to Iran, and the United States would resupply
Israel and receive the payment.  Many investigations followed these actions, including one
by Congress and Reagan’s Tower Commission.  Five individuals were charged with aiding
the Contras, but charges were dismissed. See Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1265
(1988).
2. See Julius Lobel, Covert War and the Constitution, 5 NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 393
(2012) (commenting on Special Operations Forces that have engaged in “clandestine,
anti-terrorist military activities” and Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) “shadow” wars
against terrorists). Id. at 394.  Operation Desert Shield is another recent example.  Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush deployed 50,000 ground troops, along with 300 aircraft, to
Kuwait to battle the invading Iraqi forces without congressional approval or appropriated
funds. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Com-
mander in Chief’s Spending Power, 81 IOWA L. REV. 79, 85–86 (1995).
3.  See Lobel, supra note 2, at 402 (arguing that the Constitution provided discretion
for the Executive in certain paramilitary activities but not in “[i]nitiating war”).
4. 962 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2013).  Twenty-four American citizens, two injured
in terrorist attacks, residing in Israel alleged that John Kerry violated several statutes by
243
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the case for standing reasons, the plaintiffs would have challenged the
Secretary of State’s decision to send military support to Nicaraguan
rebels under the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related
Programs Appropriations Act (“SFOAA”)5 and other statutes governing
aid to foreign organizations and countries.  Congress has developed a
complex system for analyzing the Executive Branch’s power in this
realm by setting up reporting requirements and adding a multitude of
riders to bills.6  It is questionable how effective these statutes are at
curbing Executive power-grabs, especially when the Executive has
found evasive techniques for accomplishing its goals.  For example, the
usual statutory definition for “military support” has always included
activities such as arming, training, directing, and sending out troops,
but now statutory definitions must cover guerilla support and logistics
in order to rein in presidential power in those areas.7  This definition
should also include funding, at least when the United States directs the
distribution of funds at a micro-level.8
From involving the US forces in North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organiza-
tion-led actions in Haiti and Bosnia,9 to caring for migrants at Guanta-
namo,10 to sending drones to Somalia,11 the American people, through
the structure set up by the Constitution, must decide what the Execu-
tive can and cannot do and what Congress’s role is in limiting that
authority.  Unless cases such as Bernstein eventually reach the merits, the
Judiciary will not be the arbiter in this realm; instead, the political pro-
cess may be the decision-maker.  The cases United States v. Curtiss-
Wright12 and Dames & Moore v. Reagan13 affirmed extensive executive
power in foreign affairs, meaning that Congress must be careful in wres-
tling power from the Executive in overseas spending.
This Note argues that the President has broad authority to send
financial and material support to foreign governments and non-govern-
providing money and resources to the Palestinian Authority and non-governmental
groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Id.  For another example from the Obama
administration, see Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorized Secret Help for Libya Rebels,
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2011, 6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/us-lib
ya-usa-order-idUSTRE72T6H220110330.  In this article, Voice of America intelligence
correspondent Gary Thomas described covert action as encompassing “propaganda, cov-
ert funding, electoral manipulation, arming and training insurgents, and even encourag-
ing a coup.” Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2012).
6. See Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring
Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998).
7. Lobel, supra note 2, at 401.
8. See Koh, supra note 1, at 1302–03 (arguing that when the Executive solicits third
parties to accomplish its objectives, it escapes Congress’s power of the purse so long as it
does not exercise control over the third parties).
9. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 1–2.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Lobel, supra note 2, at 407.
12. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding that Congress could delegate to the President the
power to ban sales of arms to certain countries).
13. 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (holding that the President could terminate proceedings
against Iran in U.S. courts without even implied Congressional approval due to the Presi-
dent’s authority in foreign affairs).
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mental organizations (“NGOs”) so long as Congress does not statutorily
express disapproval.  Part I discusses what the Constitution says about
military spending abroad, both from a congressional and an executive
standpoint.  In addition, this part describes the Judicial Branch’s deci-
sions regarding executive power to direct funds abroad.  Part II
describes the United States’ international spending process, which is
now the primary mechanism for curbing executive power.  It also dis-
cusses how the Executive has managed to evade the control mecha-
nisms set out by Congress, and it elucidates the relevant statutory
framework for Bernstein v. Kerry, which is then applied to that case.  In
order to analyze the legality and constitutionality of an executive deci-
sion to send financial military support abroad, one must scrutinize the
President’s acts through an ordered series of questions.
First, the President must comply with statutes governing funds for
overseas spending by either following the written word or by exercising
appropriate waivers.  If he does not follow all procedures, then we ask if
Congress has sufficiently “disapproved” of his action.  Looking to the
relevant case law, if Congress does not strongly disapprove of a Presi-
dential action in the international arena, then his action is constitu-
tional due to the power vested in him by Article II.14  When Congress
develops a statutory framework with several waivers, it manifests an
intent that the President exercise some discretion in the relevant area.
This endorsement of executive discretion cannot then be used to show
disapproval of an executive action when the waivers are later found to
be so muddled and convoluted that they render that discretion mean-
ingless.  In Bernstein, the relevant statutory framework appears to whole-
heartedly endorse executive discretion in spending in the Middle East.
Congress probably intended this discretion in anticipation of the need
for flexibility in diplomacy.  Thus, Congress cannot now claim that it
disapproves of the President’s discretionary act to send funds to the
Palestinian Authority and non-governmental organizations in the area
merely because he made a procedural error in executing the statutes.
I. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SPENDING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
One branch of government rarely, if ever, has the authority to uni-
laterally fund military operations abroad.  The Constitution ensures a
drawn-out, scrutinized process for sending funds internationally.  This
Part spells out congressional and presidential roles in the funding pro-
cess by presenting various scholarly theories and illuminating the most
cogent approach: the Spending and Appropriations Clauses of Article I
demonstrate that all spending originates in Congress.  When appropria-
tions are made in the international arena, however, the President has
discretion, founded in the Vesting Clause, to execute those appropria-
tions as he sees fit, so long as he acts without Congress’s disapproval.
14. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
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A. Congress’s Authority to Regulate Military Funding Abroad
The Constitution grants the Legislature, as the most democratic
representative of the People, broad authority in both domestic and for-
eign affairs.  It grants Congress the power of the purse, which influ-
ences nearly every other delegated power.  The Appropriations Clause
further enhances this authority.  Congress also has the power to raise
and support armies, to declare war, and to grant marques and repri-
sals—scholars have proposed that these three powers are determinative
in the issue at hand, but this Note rejects that premise, as each of those
powers is explicitly confined to wartime.  Still, it is important to
examine each power in order to understand Congress’s role in sending
funds to foreign countries and non-governmental organizations, as
spending questions originate in Congress.
1. The “Spending” and “Appropriations” Clauses
The Constitution provides, “The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defen[s]e and general Welfare of the United States.”15  While the
placement of the “Spending Power” in this clause suggests that it is only
connected to money raised through taxes,16 there is some suggestion
that the power is in fact greater.17  Following this grant of power is the
power to borrow money on credit.18  The Founders broadly understood
this portion of the Constitution.  First, the “only express boundaries”
are very explicit, referring to judicial and presidential salaries and two-
year appropriations for the Army.19  Next, the Appropriations Clause
emphasizes congressional control by stating, “No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.”20  Since “[n]o legislative power is given to any other branch of
the federal government,”21 it follows that the spending power is vested
in Congress.  The ratification debates also demonstrate an understand-
ing of the breadth of this power.22  With respect to funding military
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
17. While Rosen does not express this view outright, he comments on how the
Spending Power is not limited to the enumerated powers and how it is “co-extensive” with
the general welfare clause, meaning it was intended to allow Congress to “secure ends it
could not otherwise achieve through coercive legislation . . . .”  Rosen, supra note 6, at 23.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
19. Rosen, supra note 6, at 19.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
21. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, & FOREIGN AFFAIRS 18 (1990).
22. See Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, & The Constitution: On Recovering Our
Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 507, 522–32 (1993).  Both the Magna Carta
and the Charter of Confirmation limited the King’s power to raise revenues.  When King
James tried to raise revenues in creative ways, Parliament continuously curbed his
advances. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 30–43.  “Control over the public purse was the cor-
nerstone of British representative democracy.  It served as the instrument for parliamen-
tary supremacy, compelling monarchs to surrender their royal prerogatives . . . .” Id. at
44.  Furthermore, it was the way in which taxpayers would have a “voice in how their
money was spent.” Id.  State constitutions also granted the appropriations power to their
legislatures. Id. at 61.  Convention delegates warned of possible encroachments by the
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initiatives, Nathaniel Gorham stated, “[T]he means of carrying on the
war would not be in the hands of the President, but of the
Legislature.”23
History and legislative commentary are not the only affirmations of
Congress’s power over the purse: custom, too, affirms Congress’s role.
Presidents have often “acceded to Congress’s power to dispose of their
proposals.”24  Not seeking to outright deny congressional power, Presi-
dents also have often read restrictive provisions in a narrow way so that
their actions do not fall under the statute.25  Furthermore, when Presi-
dents have spent money contrary to Congress’s will, they have crawled
back to Congress asking for ratification to cure the mistake.26
At present, some argue that the President requires a minimum
amount of spending authority to accomplish his objectives, especially
national security or foreign affairs objectives,27 but this runs contrary to
the structure set up by the Constitution.28  This Note adopts the view
that the President must operate under appropriations by Congress,
even in the foreign realm.  This view is not contrary to the “Take Care”
Clause29 because that clause refers to acts passed by Congress—it is not
a blanket power given to the President.  Thus, the analytical starting
point for questions like the one presented in Bernstein is the Appropria-
tions Clause.  Congress may even legislate into the specific details of an
appropriation, but it must do so overtly in order to comply with the
Constitution; otherwise, it begins to infringe on the President’s execu-
tive powers.
2. Congress’s Power to “Raise and Support Armies,” “Declare War,”
and “Grant Marques and Reprisals”
The Constitution grants Congress exclusive control to “raise and
support Armies” with only one restriction: each appropriation expires
Executive Branch.  Franklin worried that the President would attempt to “extort” money
from the Legislature.  1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 99 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1911) (June 4, 1787) (remarks of Benjamin Franklin).  Mason expressed similar
concerns. Id. at 144 (June 6, 1787) (remarks of George Mason).
23. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 540 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
24. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 88 (noting that “presidential objections in such cases
are directed towards the offending condition or rider . . . rather than the appropriation
itself”). Id. at 90.
25. In 1876, President Grant read an appropriation statute that required the clo-
sure of certain diplomatic offices as merely expressing a “constitutional prerogative of
Congress” for the closures. Id. at 91.  During Vietnam, the President acquiesced in fund-
ing restrictions over national security. Id. at 93.
26. See id. at 103.
27. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1253
(1989).  Sidak argues that the Framers would not have given the President responsibilities
that could be held “hostage” by Congress. Id.
28. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 74.  Rosen argues that the Framers intended Con-
gress’s “veto” power as an absolute check on the President. Id.  Other than impeachment,
the Appropriations Clause is Congress’s only method of limiting the President’s
discretion.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE108.txt unknown Seq: 6 20-APR-15 9:52
248 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 29
after two years.30  As Alexander Hamilton explained, this power enables
Congress to “build and equip fleets—to prescribe rules for the govern-
ment of both—to direct their operations—to provide for their support.
These powers ought to exist without limitation . . . .”31  The Constitu-
tion also grants Congress the power to “declare War” and “grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal.”32  Since the Framers initially planned to use
the word “make” instead of “declare” war, there is some debate as to
how great this power truly is,33 but more troublesome is the language of
“marque and reprisal.”  Some argue that this term ensures that Con-
gress authorizes all armed hostilities against foreign nations,34 while
others contend that it should be read much more narrowly.35  Consid-
ering that American Presidents have sent military forces and supplies
abroad more than 200 times with, in many cases, little repercussion,36
this Note takes the view that the Executive can initiate hostilities short
of war, subject to appropriations limitations.
B. The President’s Authority to Send Funds and Military Support Abroad
While there are fewer clauses granting the Executive, rather than
Congress, power in foreign affairs, the ones that do are arguably more
extensive.  For example, the “Vesting Clause” has an ambiguity that
defeats many limitations on presidential power.  The separation of pow-
ers debate, in the funding context, revolves around whether Congress
has most of the power, subject to the President’s enumerated powers as
“the Executive” and as Treaty-maker, or whether the President holds
the majority of the power, subject to Congress’s enumerated powers.
This Note endorses the former idea: after Congress makes an appropri-
ation, the President is vested with the power to “execute” that appropri-
ation.  With regard to foreign affairs, the Vesting Clause gives him
discretion in that execution, so long as Congress does not manifest its
disapproval.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
31. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
33. See Robert F. Turner, Covert War and the Constitution: A Response, 5 J. NAT’L SEC.
L. & POL’Y 409, 414 (2012) (arguing that the power to declare war should be construed
narrowly because the term “declare” came from the law of nations, meaning “large-scale
perfect wars”).  He claims that the term referred to “all-out ‘offensive’ [ ] wars”). Id.
34. See Lobel, supra note 2, at 398.  In the eighteenth century, this term referred to
the governmental license for private use of force; however, its meaning expanded to
cover more “general letters.”  In some cases, the term referred to an “intermediate state
between peace and war” and “imperfect” wars. Id. at 397 (quoting 8 ANNALS OF CONG.
1511 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin)); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
62 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ed., 1873 (1926)).
35. See Turner, supra note 33, at 415–16 (pointing out that Lobel is using flawed
logic when he says that simply because the term refers to one means of “imperfect war,” it
refers to all imperfect wars).  He notes that “marque and reprisal” referred to a very spe-
cific authorization for private ship owners to redress wrongs, and that even in nations
conferring nearly all “war powers” on the King, this grant of power was left to the legisla-
tive body. Id. at 418.
36. Id. at 419.
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1. The “Vesting” Clause
Article II of the Constitution begins, “The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.”37  While Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer38 took a narrow view of this clause,39
Justice Jackson’s famous tri-step approach suggested a broader interpre-
tation,40 and Curtiss-Wright affirmed that the executive power contains
extra-constitutional components.41  Of course, the approaches in these
cases are still quite controversial.  While the Vesting Clause provides the
President with much ammunition in the foreign affairs debate, both
history and custom demonstrate that this Clause does not include a
spending power.42  Thus, some have suggested that the President may
authorize “mandatory appropriations,” forcing Congress to appropriate
funds when necessary for his presidential prerogatives.43  However,
since Presidents have generally acted at their own risk and then sought
ex post facto appropriation,44 it is likely the power of the purse caps the
executive power.  Still, this should not be read to hamper the Presi-
dent’s power severely; the political process often limits Congress from
legislating very far into the details of its appropriations.
2. The “Commander in Chief” and “Treaty-Making” Clauses
While the President is the “Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy . . . and of the Militia of the several States,”45 this power is limited
by the fact that he can neither “raise nor support forces by his own
authority.”46  George Nicholas opened the Virginia Convention saying,
“Any branch of government that depends on the will of another for
37. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1.
38. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
39. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 87, 99 (2001).
40. See id. at 104.  “[T]he President’s foreign affairs powers are not delegated by the
Constitution, but are implicit in the nature of sovereignty and inherent in the office
itself.” Id.  This tri-step approach states that when the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its “maximum” because it
includes his constitutionally-granted powers and those authorized by Congress. Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  When he acts absent Congress’s authoriza-
tion or denial of power, he must rely entirely on his constitutionally-granted powers. Id.
at 637.  Lastly, if he takes measures “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb” because he must rely on his constitutionally-
granted powers, capped by Congress’s constitutional powers over the matter. Id.
41. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., Justice Sutherland refers to the “del-
icate, plenary, and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal gov-
ernment in the field of international relations. . . .”  299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
42. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 70.
43. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 127.
44. Id. at 131.  For instance, when Jefferson ordered the purchase on credit of tim-
ber for gunboats, presuming that Congress would sanction it, he made “no claim of ‘law’
for his initiatives.” Id.
45. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
46. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 81 (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 93, 258 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1988) (Ayer Co. 1987)).
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supplies or money must be in a state of subordinate dependence.”47
On the other hand, many argue that “ ‘Congress cannot impose condi-
tions which invade Presidential prerogatives to which the spending is at
most incidental.’”48  In the latter formulation of the President’s and
Congress’s concurrent powers over foreign affairs, these prerogatives
are known as “areas of special competence.”49  Even though the Presi-
dent could in theory veto a statute that invades an area of special com-
petence (and probably has some obligation to do so), he and Congress
cannot contract to violate the Constitution.50
Another area of special competence is the power to “make Trea-
ties.”51  At some level, then, the President is “clearly a separate source
of law.”52  Thomas Jefferson emphasized this idea when he remarked
that, “the transaction of business with foreign nations is executive alto-
gether . . . . Exceptions are to be construed strictly.”53  Of course, the
President’s duty to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate limits
the treaty-making power.  Since this condition allows for the separation
of powers to keep the President in check when making treaties, a new
question appears: does the Appropriations Clause limit the treaty-mak-
ing power even further, or would this cause an imbalance in favor of
Congress?  A look to judicial framing of the questions raised in these
sections sheds some light on the way the three branches must play off
each other to produce an end result that is satisfactory to the American
people.
C. Judicial Treatment of the Congressional-Presidential Power Struggle
The Court has been reluctant to take a stance on the separate roles
of the respective branches in sending military support abroad.  Two
strains of cases exist in the Court’s jurisprudence: the first focuses on
the constitutional limits placed on Presidential power, while the second
greatly expands Presidential power in the foreign affairs arena, focusing
on the Vesting Clause and the treaty-making power discussed above.
47. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 93, 393 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (Ayer Co. 1987).
48. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s Impoundment of
National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J 1, 87 (2001) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 112, 113–115 (1972)).  In 1912, Senator Bacon
proposed an amendment to the Army Appropriation bill that would prohibit funds for
“‘pay or supplies of any part of the army of the United States employed or stationed in
any country or territory beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States . . . .’” See
Eli Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign Relations, 286 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 154 (1953) (quoting 48 CONG. REC. 10,921–30 (1912)).
This proposal was defeated, and Senator Borah stated, “but if the Army is in existence, if
the Navy is in existence, if it is subject to command, he [the President] may send it where
he will . . . .” See Bennet N. Hollander, The President and Congress—Operational Control of the
Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REV. 49, 62 (1966) (quoting 69 CONG. REC. 6760 (1928)).
49. See Brownell, supra note 48, at 83.
50. See id. at 10.
51. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 1, n.2 (1987).
53. 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378–79 (J. Boyd ed., 1961).
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One of the first cases addressing the Appropriations Clause was Lit-
tle v. Barreme, where the President ordered the capture of an American
vessel leaving France, but the statute authorizing him to capture ships
only referred to those heading to France.54  The federal government
ordered the return of the ship because the President’s act was not
explicitly authorized by the statute.55  Even though this case involved
foreign affairs, the court held that the President could not act contrary
to a statute prohibiting military expeditions against nations with which
the United States was at peace.56  Similarly, in Brown v. United States,57
the Marshall Court held that the President was not authorized to issue
commissions to privateers to capture British subjects on land when the
Act passed by Congress referred only to capturing vessels and goods on
the high seas.  The Court said that a decision to confiscate enemy prop-
erty was a question only for the Legislature, not for the Executive or the
courts, as they only implement the law as expressed.58  Slightly later
cases also followed this view of the Appropriations Clause.59  Even cases
that appeared to favor the President’s power were, in fact, never at the
expense of congressional powers.  For instance, in Durand v. Hollins,60
the plaintiff was unable to recover for damages arising out of a bom-
bardment by a naval vessel, which was authorized by the Executive,
because the court found the actions of the vessel to be consistent with
general statutes establishing the Departments of Foreign Affairs and
Navy.61  Then came Curtiss-Wright, where Congress passed and the Presi-
dent signed a joint resolution authorizing the President to prohibit
arms sales to combatants if he found that a prohibition would “‘contrib-
ute to the reestablishment of peace between [the] countries[ ]” of
Bolivia and Paraguay.62  The Court found this joint resolution to be
54. 6 U.S. 170 (1804).
55. Id. Two years later, the Court again confined the President’s powers to those
approved by Congress when an American colonel attempted to prove that his military
actions in Venezuela were authorized by the President and thus not contrary to the laws
of the United States.  United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No.
16,342).
56. Smith, 27 F. Cas at 1229–30.
57. 12 U.S. 110, 128–29 (1814).
58. Id.
59. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (holding no officer could draw
money from the Treasury without an appropriation made by Congress).  In fact, the
Court explicitly opined, “However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time,
not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of anything not thus previously sanctioned.”
Id.  The Court of Claims applied the same principle over twenty years later when the
President attempted to grant a pardon to individuals who had formerly assisted the Con-
federacy.  Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886).
60. 8 F. Cas 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186). See also the Prize Cases, where the
Court upheld President Lincoln’s blockade at the beginning of the Civil War, absent an
actual declaration of war, because it found that there was a de facto state of war.  The Brig
Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).  In any event, Congress
ratified the action, so the actual legal issue was never judicially resolved.
61. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 121.
62. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936) (quoting
President Franklin).  President Franklin Roosevelt then issued an embargo that was vio-
lated by Curtiss-Wright, when this corporation and others conspired to sell arms to
Bolivia. Id.
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constitutional, reasoning that Congress had greater flexibility to dele-
gate power outside US boundaries.63 Dames & Moore v. Regan pushed
even further for the President, holding that he could suspend Ameri-
can claims against Iran when there was congressional “acquiescence.”64
Up to this point, however, the Court never held that the President had
power to act unilaterally nor contrary to Congress.
Later cases, on the other hand, began to interpret Curtiss-Wright
and Dames & Moore as granting the President new foreign affairs pow-
ers.  Regarding congressional delegation to the Executive in foreign
affairs, Zemel v. Rusk reasoned that Congress must “paint with a brush
broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.”65  Later,
Clinton v. City of New York, citing Curtiss-Wright, said that the President
has “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”66
Thus, more recent cases have followed the Youngstown framework,67
upholding the President’s actions in foreign affairs when Congress does
not “sufficiently” disapprove of the actions.
Therefore, the Court’s jurisprudence has not yet provided us with
a solid framework for analyzing the question presented by this Note.  It
is notable that past cases have dealt either with (1) individual statutes,
(2) a small, identifiable number of statutes, or (3) statutes that are
painted with a broad brush.  In other words, past cases have not
addressed the question in this Note: what occurs when Congress’s inter-
national powers, embodied primarily in the Appropriations Clause,
meet with the President’s international powers, embodied in the Vest-
ing and Treaty-making Clauses?  In general, the President cannot act
contrary to statute, either explicitly or impliedly.  On the other hand,
more recently, the Court has been more likely to find congressional
approval where there is silence because of a tendency to defer to the
Executive in foreign affairs.  This Note takes the argument one step
further: if Congress legislates ambiguously in foreign affairs, it cannot
manifest disapproval of Presidential action in that area.  In fact, as we
will see in the statutory framework of Bernstein, congressional ambiguity
63. Id. at 329.
64. 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).  “Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate
authority does not, ‘especially . . . in the areas of foreign policy and national security,’
imply ‘congressional disapproval’ of action taken by the Executive.” Id. at 678 (citing
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)). Haig stated that congressional silence could not
be equated with disapproval.  453 U.S. at 291.  In other words, congressional silence could
be interpreted as consent. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
673 (1952) (“[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsi-
bility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”); John S.
Baker, Jr., Competing Paradigms of Constitutional Power in “The War on Terrorism,” 19 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 5, 14 (2005) (“The Constitution is unusual in that it is to
be read not as a list of parchment barriers, but as institutionalizing a system of separated
powers.”) (internal citation removed).
65. 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
66. 524 U.S. 417, 445 (1998).
67. See Bellia, supra text accompanying note 40.
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can actually be interpreted as an endorsement of Presidential
discretion.
The issue in this Note arises when several moderately-specific stat-
utes combine to severely limit Presidential discretion, yet they appear,
through the placement of waivers, to grant him a great deal of discre-
tion.  Congress may not hide its objectives under a muddled framework,
rather than allow the political process to see the ultimate spending
decisions it has made.  When it sets up a framework that seems to allow
the President discretion but simultaneously limits his discretion
entirely, Congress leads the American people to believe that the Presi-
dent is making decisions that he is not actually able to make.68  If Con-
gress manifests an intent that the President exercise its discretion in an
area of the law, it must live with that manifestation.
II. FLEXIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SPENDING
UNDER THE STATUTES
A. Presidential Discretion in Financing International Operations
When Congress has appropriated funds during peacetime for over-
seas spending, the President has a varying amount of discretion,
depending on how the relevant statute is written or on different meth-
ods of spending that have been developed through custom.  Discretion-
ary spending mechanisms include contingency funds, transfers, special
authority for emergencies, defense drawdown funds, donated funds
(also known as gift authority), and a more complicated technique of
negotiating with third parties to give funds where the President sees fit.
A brief explanation of each of these methods of spending is useful for
understanding when the President has failed to comply with the statu-
tory framework governing his international spending decision.
1. Contingency Funds
The most general mechanism the President may utilize for spend-
ing discretion occurs when Congress makes a lump-sum appropriation,
meaning the President’s spending must comport with the “general pur-
pose” of the appropriation, covering expenses that are “necessary,
proper, or incident” to execution of that purpose.69  A specific type of
lump-sum appropriation occurs in a national security setting, where
Congress provides the President with separate accounts to cover contin-
gencies.70  For example, the Foreign Assistance Act (“FAA”) was created
68. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1, at 1302–03 (interpreting United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946) (holding that Congress cannot use the power of purse to effect bill of
attainder)).
69. Rosen, supra note 6, at 9 (describing 63 Comp. Gen. 800, 804 B-221982 (1986);
63 Comp. Gen. 110, 112 (1983)).  The expenditures must bear a “logical relationship” to
the appropriation. Id.  (quoting 63 Comp. Gen. 422, 427–28 (1984)).  For instance, mili-
tary services may not use their Operations and Maintenance accounts to pay for nontradi-
tional missions.
70. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 99.
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as a contingency fund for uses “in the national interest.”71  While this
fund has become less flexible, other contingency funds have appeared
on the scene.  One of the most famous instances of abuse of a contin-
gency fund occurred in 1981 when President Ronald W. Reagan used a
contingency fund hidden in the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)
budget to support the Nicaraguan Contras.72
2. Special Authority and Drawdown Funds
Next, the Executive can ask Congress for special authority for
emergency spending when a crises arises.  Of course, agencies may
experience difficulty in obtaining their requests, but if their requests
are sufficiently broad, this is a useful mechanism for wielding executive
discretion.  Generally, an agency will ask for a supplemental appropria-
tion in the following year’s appropriation to liquidate obligations
incurred during an emergency.73  For example, Congress established
the Feed and Forage Act74 primarily to finance military essentials under
conditions involving remote assignments and slow communications, but
through this Act, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) funded Opera-
tion Desert Shield/Storm.75  Additionally, Congress passed the Defense
Production Act of 1950 to fund the Korean War, granting the President
authority to divert goods and services to military use in an emergency.76
While this Act has since expired, Congress approved short-term exten-
sions of some provisions in later years.77  Special authority also flows
from provisions in statutes that allow flexibility where “important to the
security of the United States.”78
Defense “drawdown” authority is granted to the President when-
ever a statute provides for a specified amount of funds for spending
“vital to the security of the United States.”79  President Nixon used this
authority to support the secret war in Cambodia in the 1970s, so in
71. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 451, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).  President John F. Kennedy
established the Peace Corps by executive order through this fund, and Presidents Lyndon
B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon utilized it for the President’s Commission on Civil
Disorders and the Bahama Livestock and Research Project.  From 1973 onward, Congress
restricted the FAA fund to “disaster relief purposes.”  Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note
2, at 100 (quoting Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 10, 87 Stat. 714,
719 (1973)).
72. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 101.  This contingency fund had
only been approved by the intelligence committees, thus President Reagan avoided
obtaining explicit congressional approval. Id.
73. Id. at 102.  Without making this request, the agency would be violating the
Antideficiency Act, which proscribes deficiency spending.  31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A)
(1994).
74. 41 U.S.C. § 11 (2009).
75. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 102.
76. Id. at 103 (discussing 50 U.S.C. § 2061 (1988) (amended by Pub. L. No. 102-
558, 106 Stat. 4198 (1992))).
77. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 103.
78. 22 U.S.C. § 2364(a) (1994).
79. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 105 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2318(a)
(1994)).
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response, Congress enacted prior notice and finding requirements.80
President Reagan also employed drawdown authority from a fund
earmarked for military emergencies in order to increase military aid to
El Salvador in 1981-82.81  More recently, the President has utilized
drawdown funds for counternarcotics, disaster relief, and United
Nations peacekeeping efforts under the FAA.82
3. Transfers and Reprogramming
The President may also utilize transfers and reprogramming in
order to fund military initiatives.  Transfers occur when the President
applies funds from one appropriations account to another appropria-
tions account, whereas reprogramming “constitutes executive shifting
of appropriated funds within a single appropriation account, often
without specific statutory mandate.”83  During the Iran-Contra Affair,
the 1984 Boland Amendment84 limiting aid to the Contras was circum-
vented when President Reagan transferred ships, planes, and weapons
to the CIA.85  While transfers without statutory authority are now pro-
hibited, defense and foreign assistance agencies typically obtain this
authority, subject to a percentage limit.86  Since 1974, the President has
been prevented from using DOD transfers “where the item for which
funds were requested has been denied by Congress.”87  Reprogram-
ming operates differently from transferring because it occurs through
an informal agreement, rather than a statutory provision, between an
agency and a congressional committee.88  So long as it complies with
the general purpose of the original appropriation and is not otherwise
prohibited by statute, reprogramming is permissible.89  Initially, con-
gressional review, triggered by reprogramming “thresholds,” was the
only limit on the President’s authority, but the flexibility of this system
later resulted in Congress limiting reprogramming requests for DOD
funds to “higher priority items based on unforeseen military require-
80. Id. at 105.  In many cases, the finding requirements are nebulous. See Jeffery A.
Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 69, 74–75 (1988).
81. He increased military aid by five times the amount appropriated.  Koh, supra
note 1, at 1302 n.217.
82. INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. &
SCH., U.S. ARMY, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 259 (Grimes et al. eds., 2006).
83. Koh, supra note 1, at 1302 n.217 (discussing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CON-
GRESS: POWER AND POLICY 110–32 (1972)).
84. See supra text accompanying note 1.
85. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 105.
86. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).  Abuses of transfer authority run rampant: this
authority funded the secret war in Laos from the Agency and International Development
fund.  President Nixon used the FAA for programs in Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, the Philip-
pines, and Vietnam, later requesting that the transferred funds be restored. Id. at 112.
87. DOD Appropriation Act 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-238, § 735, 87 Stat. 1026, 1044
(1974).
88. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 108.
89. Id.  (describing U.S. General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropri-
ations Law, No. 2-25 to 2-27 (2d. ed. 1991)).
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ments”90 and prohibiting the practice “where the item for which
reprogramming is requested has been denied by Congress,”91 similar to
the transfer prohibition above.
4. Statutory Gift Authority, Third Party Solicitation, and Quid Pro
Quo Arrangements
If the Executive is unsuccessful in securing finances for its desired
initiative, it may instead utilize statutory gift authority to accomplish its
goal.  Gift authority is an exception to the Miscellaneous Receipts Act,92
which states that all funds received by the government must be appro-
priated before they are spent.  It operates by permitting agencies to use
a subset of lump-sum spending for “national security activities;” how-
ever, Congress has mostly closed off this method with a statute requir-
ing Congress to define the spending objects.93  Congress’s attempts to
restrict gift authority spending have caused the President to react in two
ways: by “encouraging third parties to pursue the policies he favors”94
and by forming “quid pro quo spending arrangements.”95  The prob-
lem with the first response is that the act of “encouraging” third parties
requires Executive employees to spend their time, and thus the federal
payroll, on activities not endorsed, and sometimes explicitly rejected, by
Congress.  Some argue that the public funds spent for these activities
are only “trivial” and are, in a literal sense, only being spent on commu-
nication with foreign leaders, as opposed to being the actual disburse-
ment of funds into foreign pockets, so they are permissible.96
Supporting this idea is the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1990,97 which makes no
prohibitions on solicitations, but does limit quid pro quo arrangements,
as discussed below.  Based on the current statutory framework, this
Note uses a separation-of-powers analysis to determine the legality of
Executive solicitation of third party expenditures on foreign soil.  In
general, mere solicitation is constitutional, so long as it is not excessive,
and so long as it follows statutory reporting requirements set up by Con-
90. DOD Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-172, § 8010, 105 Stat. 1150,
1173 (1991).
91. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE, BUDGET
GUIDANCE MANUAL 7110-1-M, 431–32 (May 1990).
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1994).
93. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 107 (describing the effect of 10
U.S.C. § 2608(c) (1994)).  During the Iran-Contra Affair, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North created a covert organization called The Enterprise, which solicited contributions
from third parties.  It received $32 million from the Saudi Arabian government to sup-
port the Contras. Id.
94. Id. at 136.  This power is largely based on practice, rather than the text of the
Constitution, and the practice has been supported by dicta in Curtiss-Wright and Dames &
Moore. Id.
95. Id. at 138.
96. Id. at 143.
97. Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 582(a), 103 Stat. 1195, 1251 (1989) (hereinafter Foreign
Operations Act).
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gress, which must be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the Appropriations Clause and shared foreign relations powers.98
Quid pro quo arrangements are more complicated.  In these, the
United States conditions foreign aid on the recipient’s promise to
donate funds to the object designated by the President.  In many cases,
the Neutrality Act prohibits these arrangements because it forbids per-
sons within the country from “knowingly. . . furnish[ing] the money for,
or tak[ing] part in, any military or naval expedition. . . against a foreign
government.”99  Courts have found that this Act applies not only to pri-
vateers, but also to the President.100  On the other hand, no prosecu-
tion against the President has taken place since 1806, perhaps because
the definition of “arrangement” is unclear: on the one hand, it could
refer only to explicit agreements where the U.S. intends to influence
the third party, whereas on the other hand, it could refer to any
instance in which an organization receives a reward from the U.S. after
supporting a cause the U.S. happens to favor.101  Since these arrange-
ments are rarely reduced to writing and are conducted on a “back chan-
nel, deliberately outside the realm of normal diplomacy,”102 this Note
takes the view that the Neutrality Act prohibits most quid pro quo
arrangements.  Furthermore, the Foreign Operations Act mentioned
above prohibits circumvention of Congress’s spending appropriations
through the mechanism of third party funding.
5. Meaning for Bernstein v. Kerry
It is with the above mechanisms in mind that one must analyze the
legality of the Secretary of State’s actions in cases like Bernstein v.
Kerry.103  First, he or she must identify the “general appropriations” per-
mitted by each statute in the overall framework and decide whether the
expenditure at issue fits within one of those appropriations.  If (a) it
fits, (b) there are no other prohibitions, and (c) it follows statutory pro-
cedures and reporting requirements, then the expenditure is legal.  If
(a) it does not fit within a relevant statute, (b) it is prohibited by a
statute in the overall framework, or (c) it does not follow procedures or
reporting requirements, then it must be justified by other provisions in
the framework.  For example, there may be “contingency fund author-
ity” present in one of the statutes.  Subsequently, “special authority” or
“drawdown” provisions may allow for Executive expenditures overseas
when a “national emergency” arises or when the expenditure is “vital to
national security.”  If the expenditure cannot be justified on these
grounds, the President may have transferred or reprogrammed the
funds (following the provisions of the statute, or perhaps illegally).
98. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 144.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994).  Some scholars say that these expenditures have the
effect of “laundering.”  Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 139.
100. Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev’d on other
grounds, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
101. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 2, at 139.
102. Id. at 141.
103. 962 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2013).
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Lastly, and only in some cases, the President may have utilized statutory
gift authority or third party contributions to accomplish Executive
goals.
If the President has violated one or more of the statutes, the next
issue is whether Congress has expressed disapproval of his action.  Con-
gress’s placement of “escape valves” in international spending statutes
indicates intent that the President may exercise some discretion over
the expenditures.  If Congress wishes to limit that discretion, it may do
so, but it may not do so covertly.  Ultimately, when Congress develops a
statutory framework that is overridden with waivers and Presidential
reporting requirements, like the one in Bernstein, it cannot manifest the
level of disapproval required to invalidate Presidential spending deci-
sions in the international arena.
B. Legality of the Executive’s Actions Under Each Individual Statute
Before delving into the statutes addressed in the Complaint of
Bernstein v. Kerry, it is necessary to understand the events that generated
the case.  The Complaint alleges that defendant Secretary of State Hil-
lary Clinton is responsible for coordinating all federal aid to the Pales-
tinian Authority (“PA”) and that it was her decision to allocate roughly
$200 million from the Economic Support Fund (“ESF”) to the PA in
2012.104  Additionally, Clinton was responsible for reporting to appro-
priate committees of Congress any assistance related to international
terrorism.105  Defendant U.S. Agency for International Development
(“USAID”), the principal Executive agency that extends aid to develop-
ing nations, was also involved in Clinton’s decision, forming contracts
with operatives in the West Bank and Gaza.106  The Complaint also
alleges that USAID knew that the State Department recognized Hamas
as “foreign terrorists”107 and that Hamas won a majority of the seats in
the Palestinian parliament, meaning it “retained effective control over
political decisions” from 2007 to 2011.108  Next, the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (“PLO”) played a “material role in operating” the
PA, and Congress designated it a terrorist organization.109  Moreover,
the second largest party in the PA was Fatah, which supported terror-
104. Complaint at 6, Bernstein v. Kerry, 962 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2013) No.
12–1906 (ESH).  The ESF is intended to promote American foreign policy interests, such
as encouraging Middle East peace negotiations, by providing assistance to countries in
democratic transition.  Usually, the funds are used for infrastructure and development
projects, and they are provided on a grant basis. U.S. Foreign Military Assistance: Program
Descriptions, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/
aidindex.htm. See 22 U.S.C. § 2346(b) (1998).
105. See 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa (1996).  This extends to training services and “matters
relating to the detection, deterrence, and prevention of acts of terrorism.”  22 U.S.C.
§ 2349aa.
106. Complaint, supra note 104, at 9 (analyzing USAID MISSION, BUSINESS FORECAST
FY 2012 38–39, available at http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/get-grant-or-contract/busi
ness-forecast).
107. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
108. Complaint, supra note 104, at 9–11.
109. Id. at 11; 22 U.S.C. § 5201 (1987).
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ism, and another party, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine, was also designated a terrorist organization.110  Since the PA did
not segregate its humanitarian funds from its funds for terrorism at the
relevant time, the Complaint alleges that Clinton and USAID were in
violation of several statutes prohibiting aid to terrorist organizations.
1. State Appropriations Act of 2012
The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act, 2012111 appropriated over $3 million to the
ESF.  Section 7036(a) prohibits funds from the ESF “to support a Pales-
tinian state” unless the Secretary of State finds the governing entity (a)
has “demonstrated a firm commitment to peaceful co-existence with
the State of Israel,” (b) has taken appropriate measures to counter ter-
rorism, and (c) is working with other countries to establish peace.112
Even though Clinton had not made these findings, the Act has an
“escape clause,” allowing the President to waive the prohibition for
“national security” interests.  President Obama, however, did not exer-
cise the appropriate waiver.  Additionally, section 7040(a) prohibits
funds from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”), which includes
the ESF, to be “obligated or expended with respect to providing funds
to the [PA].”113  It offers a similar waiver provision, which President
Obama exercised on April 25, 2012.114  The Bernstein Complaint alleges
that the “detailed justification” required in the waiver does not exist,
could not have been made in good faith, and is not publicly availa-
ble.115  Even if the President had complied fully with the above provi-
sions, section 7040(f) prohibits funds from the FAA for assistance to any
entity “effectively controlled by Hamas.”116  That section’s escape valve
is slightly different in that the prohibition does not apply to power-shar-
ing governments like the PA “only if the President certifies and reports
to the Committees on Appropriations that such government, including
all of its ministers or equivalent, has publicly accepted and is complying
with the principles contained in [22 U.S.C. §2378B].”117  President
Obama has not issued the required certification.
Section 7040(f) has a second escape valve in order to retain the
President’s discretionary authority over funds: he may waive prohibi-
tions to use funds for “administrative and personal security costs of the
110. Complaint, supra note 104, at 14.
111. Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2012).
112. § 7036(a), 125 Stat. at 1218.
113. § 7040(a), 125 Stat. at 1221.
114. See White House Office of Press Secretary, Presidential Memorandum-Waiver of
Restriction on Providing Funds to the Palestinian Authority (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http:/
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/25/presidential-memorandum-waiver-re
striction-providing-funds-palestianian-a.
115. See Complaint, supra note 104, at 19.
116. § 7040(f), 125 Stat. at 1222.
117. Id. at 20.  The certification must state that “no ministry, agency, or instrumen-
tality of the Palestinian Authority is effectively controlled by Hamas” unless Hamas has
“publicly acknowledged” Israel’s right to exist and committed itself to previous agree-
ments with the U.S. and Government of Israel.  22 U.S.C. § 2378b(b)(1)(A)–(B).
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Office of the President of the [PA],” activities of that President to fulfill
his duties, and assistance for the judiciary branch of the PA.118  This
limited waiver, however, is conditioned on the President’s consultation
with appropriate congressional committees, a written policy justifica-
tion, certification that the decision is for “national security interests,”
and certification that the proposed beneficiary of the assistance is not a
member of, or effectively controlled by, Hamas or any other foreign
terrorist organization.119  The President did not exercise this waiver.
Accepting the Complaint as true, President Obama is in violation
of the State Appropriations Act of 2012.  While the $200 million from
the ESF to the PA and other organizations in the region fits within the
“general appropriation” of the Act at issue, the President failed to fol-
low three out of four certification and reporting requirements, and the
one certification he made is not publicly available.  This statute offered
what appears to be “drawdown” authority for the President for “national
security” purposes, but he failed to exercise that discretion appropri-
ately.  As far as is evident, he did not make any transfers or do any
reprogramming, nor did he attempt to use statutory gift authority.
Therefore, the President violated this Act.
2. Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006
Since 2007 and 2008, provisions of the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism
Act of 2006 have been in effect, prohibiting funding to certain nongov-
ernmental organizations in the West Bank and Gaza.  Specifically, the
Secretary of State must “take all appropriate steps to ensure that” these
organizations, and their individual members, have not advocated,
planned, sponsored, nor engaged in terrorist activity.120  Taking the
plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the Secretary of State violated this Act by
failing to take all steps to ensure that the NGOs at issue were not
engaged in terrorist activity.
3. Provisions Referring Specifically to the PA
The Secretary of State is prohibited from providing U.S. foreign
assistance to the “Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority” except by
certification that “no ministry, agency, or instrumentality of the [PA] is
effectively controlled by Hamas” or by certification that Hamas-PA has
publicly acknowledged Israel’s right to exist.121  In addition, the Presi-
dent must certify that Hamas-PA has made “demonstrable progress”
towards acknowledgement of Israel by (i) purging its security services
from individuals tied to terrorism, (ii) dismantling terrorist infrastruc-
ture, (iii) halting anti-Israel incitement, (iv) ensuring democracy, and
(v) ensuring financial transparency and accountability of all govern-
118. § 7040(f)(2), 125 Stat. at 1222.
119. § 7040(f)(2), 125 Stat. at 1222.
120. Complaint, supra note 104, at 24 (quoting Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of
2006, Pub. L. 109-446, § 620L(b)(2), 120 Stat. 3318, 3322 (2006)).
121. 22 U.S.C. § 2378b(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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ment ministries and operations.122  Since the President has not made
the required certification and probably cannot do so in good faith,123
and there are no special authority or drawdown provisions, he is in vio-
lation of this statute.
4. Provision Referring to the West Bank and Gaza
The President cannot send U.S. foreign assistance to NGOs in the
West Bank and Gaza unless he makes the certifications mentioned
above regarding the PA, the exceptions mentioned in the prior provi-
sion are met, or the requirements set out in 22 U.S.C. § 2378c are met.
This latter provision only allows funding to meet (i) “basic human
needs,” (ii) promote democracy, human rights, freedom of the press,
and non-violence, (iii) assist members of the Palestinian Legislative
Council (“PLC”), or (iv) promote U.S. national security interests.124
For the third permissible form of funding, the President must deter-
mine that the members of the PLC are not members of Hamas or any
other terrorist organization.  For the fourth, he must consult with
appropriate congressional committees regarding specific projects for
which the assistance will be used and provide a written memo certifying
necessity for national security purposes.125
The President appears to be violating this statute because even
though the aid given from the ESF to NGOs on the West Bank and
Gaza fits within “general” appropriations made by Congress, it is explic-
itly prohibited by this provision, and the President has not made the
appropriate certifications for his action to fit into one of the four excep-
tions.  The fourth exception appears to allow for some special authority
or drawdown fund use, but the President chose not to exercise that
authority.  Again, there is no use of transfers, reprogramming, or gift
authority, though the President would perhaps be able to raise these as
defenses for his use of the funds from the ESF.
5. Provisions Referring to the PLO
Title 22 U.S.C. § 2227126 prohibits the provision of federal funds
authorized for international development and programs intended to
“provide benefits to the [PLO] or entities associated with it.”  Addition-
ally, section 5202127 prohibits cooperation between the United States
and the PLO in foreign aid programs.  These provisions do not provide
the President with contingency, special authority, nor drawdown funds.
In fact, they do not even contain much in the way of escape valves.128
Thus, the fact that the President has sent funds to the PA, which is
122. 22 U.S.C. § 2378b(b)(2)(A)–(E).
123. Complaint, supra note 104, at 26.
124. Id. at 15 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2378c(b)(1)–(4) (2011)).
125. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2378c(b)(4) (2011)).
126. § 2227 (1985).
127. 22 U.S.C. § 5202 (1994).
128. There are exceptions for the International Atomic Energy Agency and United
Nations Children’s Fund if those funds provide for the discontinuation or safety inspec-
tion of nuclear facilities.
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composed partially of chief actors in the PLO, indicates that the Presi-
dent is in violation of these two provisions.
6. The Anti-Terrorism Act
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339A129 prohibits material support of foreign
organizations for anyone with the knowledge or intent that the support
be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, acts of terrorism.130  Sec-
tion 2339B131 provides for fifteen years’ imprisonment if the person has
knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization
or has engaged in terrorist activity.  There is an exception, however, for
persons whose actions are approved by the Secretary of State with the
concurrence of the Attorney General, meaning that so long as the
Attorney General concurs, the Secretary can provide material support
contrary to these provisions.132  On the other hand, the Secretary still
may not violate the Immigration and Nationality Act by providing mate-
rial support that may be used to carry out terrorist activity.133 Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project134 held that “any contribution” to terrorist
organizations violates these statutes because money is fungible.
If we take the Complaint’s allegations as true, then President
Obama has probably violated these statutes.  The difficulty arises with
the term “knowingly.”  While plaintiffs may easily be able to prove that
one should know that members of the PA are also chief actors in terror-
ist organizations such as the PLO and Hamas, they may have trouble
demonstrating actual knowledge.  Furthermore, these statutes target
material support of actual terrorist organizations, not just support of
individuals or groups associated with those organizations.  For purposes
of this Note, though, let us assume that the President is in violation of
this statute.
7. Provision Referring to the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
The Bernstein Complaint alleges that part of the ESF funds went to
an organization called the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (“UNRWA”).135  Since the United
States is the largest single-state donor to UNRWA and contributes 25
percent to UNRWA’s total budget,136 its material support has a substan-
129. § 2339A (1994).
130. There is extraterritorial jurisdiction if the offender is a national, the offense
occurs in or affects interstate commerce, or the offender aids or abets any person over
whom jurisdiction exists.  22 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(A)–(F) (1996).
131. § 2339B.
132. § 2339B(j).
133. “Terrorist activity” is defined as any unlawful activity which involves hijacking
or sabotage of conveyance, detaining and threatening someone to compel a third person
to do an act or abstain from an act, a violent act upon an internationally protected per-
son, an assassination, use of a biological, chemical, or nuclear agent, etc. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).
134. 561 U.S. 1, 7 (2010).
135. Complaint, supra note 104, at 17.
136. Id. at 18.
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tial effect on UNRWA’s activities.  Congress has prohibited contribu-
tions by the United States to UNRWA unless said organization “take[s]
all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contri-
bution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiv-
ing military training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation
Army or any other guerilla type organization . . . .”137  Since UNRWA
did not comply with its statutory duties, in 2011 Congress placed a hold
on $342 million from the ESF that was originally intended to aid the
PA.  Part of that hold was lifted in 2012, but not the portion from which
defendant Secretary of State sent the $2 million previously discussed.138
Accepting the Complaint as true, the Executive Branch is in violation of
this statute because the requirements for the exception were not
fulfilled.
8. Statutes Governing Nonfinancial Support
Bernstein v. Kerry deals with financial support to foreign govern-
ments and NGOs, but in many cases, the President may instead send
military resources and services, an act governed by additional, or in
some cases entirely different, statutes.  In these instances, the President
does not have the options of contingency funds, transfers, and
reprogramming, as he would with financial support, but he often still
has escape valves available to him.  For the limited purposes of this
Note, I only address certain sections of one of the relevant statutes as an
example of the type of analysis required to determine the legality of
Executive action.  The Arms Export Control Act139 (“AECA”) states that
no defense article or service shall be sold or leased unless (1) the Presi-
dent finds that the furnishing strengthens the security of the United
States and promotes world peace, (2) the receiving country agrees not
to transfer title to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent, (3) said
country agrees to provide substantially the same degree of security pro-
tection to the arms as the United States gives, and (4) the country is
otherwise eligible to purchase defense articles and services.140  Addi-
tionally, the President can only make sales and leases to “friendly” coun-
tries for the purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense,
hindering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and participa-
tion in collective agreements consistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.141
The AECA grants the President ultimate authority to control the
import and export of defense articles and services.142  He may even
137. 22 U.S.C. § 2221(c) (2006).
138. Complaint, supra note 104, at 18.
139. 22 U.S.C. § 2753 (1976).
140. § 2753(a)(1)–(4).  The second condition also requires the receiving country
to agree not to use the defense article or service for purposes other than those furnished
unless the consent of the President is obtained.  Thus, the President’s discretion is main-
tained in this portion of the statute.
141. 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (1976).
142. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2010).  The President is also responsible for licensing
exporters.  He may disapprove a license application if he finds that an applicant is the
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authorize a transfer of defense articles contrary to general prohibitions,
but he cannot do so for items on the United States Munitions List
unless the receiving country agrees to demilitarize the articles prior to
transfer.  The statute also allows for discretion by not requiring consent
of the President (thus relieving demilitarization duties) whenever a
treaty has been signed for the defense articles or if the recipient is not a
country.143  Next, there is a prohibition for cash sales if the recipient
country has used defense articles in substantial violation of any agree-
ment entered into pursuant to the Act, and the President must make
findings and report on said country.144  However, an escape clause
allows the President to continue cash sales if he certifies that there
would be a “significant adverse impact on United States security.”145
Other prohibitions, and their respective escape valves, also exist.
For instance, the president may not consent to a transfer of any major
defense equipment valued at $14,000,000 or more unless he submits to
the Speaker of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate a written certification naming the reasons for such trans-
fer.146  For an immediate transfer, the President must state in the certi-
fication that it is in the “national security interests” of the United States
not to delay.  The statute also states that the more restrictive subsections
do not apply to maintenance, repair, or overhaul defense services, tem-
porary transfers, or arrangements among NATO members.147  Finally,
the statute prohibits sales or leases where the President has determined
the recipient country is in material breach of its binding commitments
concerning nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices.148
In Bernstein, no violation of the AECA is evident, but in cases where
this statute has been violated, courts will examine its interaction with
the other statutes mentioned above.
As we have seen, President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry
have failed to comply with the requirements of several statutes gov-
erning financial military aid to foreign countries and NGOs.  In each
statute, Congress expressed disapproval of certain appropriations, but it
provided escape valves for the President to exercise in the case of a
subject of certain indictments or if he finds reasonable cause to believe the applicant has
violated specified statutes.  § 2778(g)(3).  He may also authorize licensing exemptions if a
bilateral agreement is in place.  §§ 2778(f)(2), (j)(1)(A).
143. Other exceptions include: the recipient is a member of NATO, and the mili-
tary equipment is not “significant.”  22 U.S.C. § 2753(b)(1)–(5) (2002).  Perhaps Presi-
dential consent is not required because it is already obtained through the signing of a
treaty.
144. § 2753(c)(1)(B).
145. § 2753(c)(3)(B).
146. § 2753(d)(1)(D).  The President may not submit such certification unless an
“emergency” exists, and the certification does not become effective until thirty days have
passed, assuming Congress has not enacted a joint resolution prohibiting the transfer
within that time.  § 2753(d)(2)(A).  The certification must contain a “detailed justifica-
tion” for the determination, describing the emergency circumstances.  § 2753(d)(2)(C).
147. § 2753(d)(4).  If the articles are valued at $100,000,000 or more or considered
“major defense equipment” valued at $25,000,000 or more, then the limitations set out
for non-NATO members apply. § 2753(d)(5).
148. § 2753(f).
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diplomatic need.  Presumably, Congress wished for these escape valves
to be effective, so that the U.S. could adapt to the changing global land-
scape.  In the next Part, we examine the statutory framework as a whole,
and I conclude that Congress is unclear in its goals regarding financial
military appropriations.  Congress has not clearly manifested disap-
proval of the President’s action in Bernstein.
C. The Statutory Framework as a Whole
This Note has determined that in Bernstein v. Kerry, the Executive
Branch is in violation of several statutes prohibiting financial military
aid to the PA and NGOs due to their connections with terrorists.  Each
statute, and each of its relevant provisions, manifests congressional
approval of some executive actions and disapproval of others.  Yet, tak-
ing a step back, a question arises: why is the President in violation of so
many statutes?  Is he intentionally disregarding laws he considers
unconstitutional?  He is probably not disregarding the laws because he
did, in some instances, exercise the waivers.  Moreover, in most
instances where a President has overstepped his authority, he has then
crawled back to Congress asking for ratification of his act, but President
Obama has not done so here.  It is more likely that the President has
not followed procedures to a “T” because they are burdensome and
unclear.  The President is uncertain whether Congress approves of his
action: it has passed statutes with numerous waivers, which suggests it
desires Presidential discretion and flexibility, but in practice, those stat-
utes limit his discretion entirely. So which is it?  Has Congress denied
financial military support to the PA and NGOs in the area, or has it
granted flexibility for this decision?
Seven statutes were relevant to the President’s decision to send
finances abroad: some, such as the State Appropriations Act and the
Anti-Terrorism Act, were highly comprehensive.  If and when President
Obama wishes to send military aid to a foreign country or NGO, he
must navigate a complicated web of exceptions and waivers.  For
instance, he could not send funds to the PA unless he met require-
ments for:
1) State Appropriations Act149
a. PA must demonstrate firm commitment to peaceful co-exis-
tence with Israel
b. PA must demonstrate efforts to counter terrorism
c. PA must be collaborating to promote world peace
2) Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006150
a. PA must show it took all possible steps to ensure no individ-
ual member of the PA has advocated, planned, sponsored, or
engaged in terrorist activity
149. Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2012). See supra Part II.B.1.
150. Pub. L. 109-446, § 620L, 120 Stat. 3318 (2006) (current version at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2378). See supra Part II.B.2–3.
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3) Provisions Relating to Hamas and the PLO151
a. neither may be in effective control of the PA
b. the PLO may not be receiving any benefits from the funds
given to the PA
4) Anti-Terrorism Act152
a. no executive actor can have knowledge that any portion of
the funds will be used in preparation for, or to carry out, acts
of terrorism
There are several problems with this list of requirements set out by
Congress.  First, they appear in four different statutes, meaning the ulti-
mate result never stood up to the tests of the political process.  If these
requirements were set out in one consolidated statute, would the stat-
ute still obtain sufficient votes?  Would the American people’s repre-
sentatives entirely withhold funds from the PA and NGOs in the West
Bank and Gaza?  Or would they prefer some adaptability to changing
global circumstances?  We must not speculate, so we instead return to
the overarching question: has Congress manifested disapproval of the
President’s decision to send military aid from the Economic Support
Fund to the PA?
Congress has not.  By creating a statutory framework overridden
with waivers and exceptions, it has manifested approval of Presidential
discretion in decisions to send financial military support abroad.  Thus,
let us turn to the exception and waiver clauses.
If the President does find exceptional circumstances that justify
sending financial support to the PA, then he must: (1) comply with
waiver provisions in the State Appropriations Act of 2012,153 (2) look to
an exception in section 7040(f) of the State Appropriations Act of
2012154 for the Executive and Judicial Branches of the PA, (3) exercise
waivers in reference to Hamas,155 (4) ensure that the end result does
not benefit the PLO under 22 U.S.C. § 2227,156 (5) ensure that the U.S.
and PLO are not cooperating in foreign aid programs under 22 U.S.C.
151. Pub. L. 109-446, § 620L, 120 Stat. 3318 (2006) (current version at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2378c); 22 U.S.C. § 2227 (1985), § 5202 (1994). See supra Part II.B.4–5.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. See supra Part II.B.6.
153. Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2012).  The President must: (a) waive the prohi-
bition on funding to the PA for “national security” purposes, (b) waive the prohibition set
out by section 7040(a) referring to ESF funds, and (c) ensure Hamas is not in effective
control of the PA, unless it has complied with certain standards set out in 22 U.S.C.
§ 2378B, in which case the President must issue the required certification. See supra Part
II.B.1.
154. Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2012).  Here, the President must: (a) consult
with appropriate congressional committees, (b) certify that the act is in the “national
security interests” of the U.S., and (c) demonstrate the recipient is not effectively con-
trolled by Hamas. See supra Part II.B.1.
155. Pub. L. 109-446, § 620L, 120 Stat. 3318 (2006).  In this case, he must: (a) cer-
tify that no instrumentality of the PA is effectively controlled by Hamas, unless the Presi-
dent can certify that Hamas has made demonstrable progress towards acknowledgement
of Israel, following very detailed requirements or (b) determine that Hamas is not a ter-
rorist organization. See supra Part II.B.4.
156. See supra Part II.B.5.
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§ 5202,157 and (6) exercise a waiver set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (if the
President has knowledge that the support will be used in preparation
for, or in carrying out, acts of terrorism).158
In order for the President to send funds to the PA in its current
status, he must follow a long, detailed waiver process.  In fact, he must
not only exercise four waivers, but he must also make two certifications
and ensure several factors set out by Congress.  Congress is circumscrib-
ing the President’s decision-making process with this statutory frame-
work: it is setting out detailed instructions on how the President should
make one decision relating to foreign affairs.  Even if he makes an hon-
est attempt to follow all procedures, it is likely that in the short
timeframe in which he must act, he will make a mistake.  If Congress
wished to manifest disapproval of the decision to send funds to the PA,
it should have stated as much in plain terms, rather than develop a
convoluted statutory framework with numerous, yet as a practical mat-
ter, ineffective, waivers.
Nor has Congress expressed disapproval of the President’s decision
to send financial aid to NGOs on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Again,
it has developed a convoluted statutory framework with several futile
waivers.  For example, in order to “legally” send financial aid to these
NGOs, the President must: (1) exercise the waivers in the State Appro-
priations Act159 mentioned above, (2) fit the funding into one of the
exceptions of 22 U.S.C. § 2378c,160 (3) comply with the requirements
of the Anti-Terrorism Act161 set out above, and (4) comply with any
holds Congress has placed on appropriations.  If the organization is
UNRWA, then the President must find that said organization has taken
all possible measures to assure that no part of the funding will furnish
assistance for guerilla military training of refugees.162
The framework governing foreign-NGO-funding is essentially the
same as the framework for funding foreign countries.  The President
must exercise many of the same statutory waivers, and executive agents
must make similar findings.  The end result is the same: the President
appears to have discretion that he, in fact, cannot really exercise as a
practical matter.  Thus, Congress failed to manifest disapproval of the
President’s decision to send funds to NGOs on the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.  Since he is vested with all “Executive” authority and was acting in
foreign affairs, he had the constitutional authority to make this funding
decision, absent congressional disapproval.
157. Or he must determine that the PLO is not a terrorist organization.  Id.
158. See supra Part II.B.8.  Or he must obtain the Attorney General’s concurrence
for acting contrary to the prohibition but still be sure to comply with the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
159. Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2012). See supra Part II.B.1.
160. If the President is utilizing the PLC exception, he must determine that no PLC
members are also members of Hamas or any other terrorist organization.  If he is instead
utilizing the “national security interests” exception, he must consult with appropriate
committees and issue a written memo.
161. See supra Part II.B.8.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
162. See supra Part II.C.
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III. CONCLUSION
When it comes to sending military support abroad, various consti-
tutional and statutory elements are at play.  It is out of this separation of
powers struggle that the Founders hoped to achieve balance.  First, they
gave Congress the power of the purse through the Spending and
Appropriations Clauses, avoiding many of the negative consequences
experienced by the British government when the King seized the
finances.  Second, they gave Congress limited power in the arena of
foreign affairs through the power to raise and support armies, the
power to declare war, and the power to grant marques and reprisals.
On the other side of the balancing equation, they vested “Executive”
power in the President, making sure not to define the term.  This power
has been interpreted by the courts as extensive, especially with regard
to foreign relations.  Thus, when the President wishes to send financial
military support to a foreign country or an NGO, his Executive and
Treaty-making powers are in tension with Congress’s power to appropri-
ate funds.
This Note, by digging into Secretary of State Clinton’s decision to
send $200 million to the Palestinian Authority and NGOs on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip in Bernstein v. Kerry, has set out a framework for
analyzing situations in which such a conflict arises.  First, the President
must comply with general appropriations made by Congress because
Congress holds the power of the purse.  Next, the President must com-
ply with the procedures of that appropriation, which could be found in
several different statutes.  In other words, if he strayed from the general
appropriation by utilizing contingency or drawdown funds, or if he
exercised a waiver, we must determine if he did so appropriately.  If he
complied with procedures, then his decision was legal and constitu-
tional.  If, however, he failed to follow procedures, we must justify his
act on other grounds, namely, by demonstrating that (1) he acted of his
own “Executive” authority and (2) Congress did not clearly manifest
disapproval of his action.
Even if Congress manifests disapproval of a particular foreign fund-
ing decision in a particular statute, it may fail to manifest disapproval in
the overall statutory framework.  When that framework contains numer-
ous waivers that appear effective on an individual level but conflict with
each other in the grand scheme of things, Congress cannot claim that it
has manifested disapproval of a Presidential decision that failed to com-
ply with all the waivers.  In the absence of congressional disapproval,
the President is empowered by the Vesting Clause to act in foreign
affairs.
None of these issues, however, will be fully addressed until courts
are able to hear cases such as Bernstein v. Kerry.163  If at some point a
case gets past the standing roadblocks, a judge will have to determine
the result of this separation of powers struggle.  In the case of Bernstein,
a judge might decide that the President’s acts, while seemingly illegal
163. 962 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2013).
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based on the statutory framework, are actually permissible based on
constitutional powers vested in him.  In a case where the overall statu-
tory framework manifests clear congressional disapproval of a decision,
though, the President will not be able to rely on the Vesting Clause for
his illegal acts.  It is in these instances that the courts truly must act;
otherwise, the President may continue to engage in illegal activities,
placing the entire country at risk.
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